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Territory and problems - theoria  
Like all young academic disciplines, the theory of 
architecture is still in search of its identity, as its 
representatives strive to deﬁ ne the boundaries of 
their territory. But what is this territory? Obviously, 
there must be speciﬁ c problems waiting to be solved 
by architectural theorists if taxpayers’ money is to 
be invested in the creation of new chairs, professor-
ships, and design-based academic grades, which is 
a completely new and somewhat puzzling phenom-
enon. Undoubtedly, even mathematics would no 
longer be on the university agenda today if it did not 
contribute substantially to the development of new 
technologies; what then can we expect of architec-
tural theory? 
The ﬁ eld of architectural theory should be deﬁ ned 
on the basis of the problems the discipline is intended 
to solve. But disciplines for architectural problem 
solving, from the design of a doorknob to regional 
planning, already exist. What kind of speciﬁ c tasks 
does architectural theory have to tackle, what kind 
of inquiries does it intend to pursue? The future 
standing of architectural theory, indeed perhaps 
its survival depends on the answers to these and 
similar questions.
We can debate the value of etymology in under-
standing the usage of terms, but its capacity to 
question generally accepted, ﬁ xed meanings is 
beyond any doubt. The Greek origin of the word 
theory, theoria, is illuminating. Thea is an occur-
rence which wants to be understood, and theoros 
is an observer, an envoy sent by a polis to a place 
of oracle like Delphi, to be present at the oracle 
and report it to his principals with authority, that 
is, without altering it, ‘for neither adding anything 
would you ﬁ nd a cure, nor subtracting anything 
would you avoid erring in the eyes of gods’ - as 
the poet Theognis of Megara (6th Century BC) 
had warned the theoros.1 The meaning of theory, 
therefore, indicates a particular way of observing: 
the way of the detached and uncommitted specta-
tor, rather than the participant. It seems, therefore, 
that the original meaning of theoria leaves no space 
for a pro-‘projective’ interpretation, with its interest 
in performance and production.
However, important questions remain. The deci-
sion of the Athenians whether to start a war against 
the Persians or to take a defensive stance depended 
on the report and interpretation of the oracle’s 
utterances by the theoros. The theoros created a 
narrative in order to bridge the gap between human 
intelligence and divine interaction. The narrative 
of the theoros, however, had to be negotiated: in 
cases where the Athenian ambassadors declined 
to accept an oracle, they refused to confer author-
ity to the theoros. We have to ask, therefore, 
whether detachment will give us a more profound 
insight than participation, or whether observation 
itself is a kind of intellectual participation. Accord-
ing to Hans-Georg Gadamer, the theoros becomes 
part of the festive celebration by attending it; via 
his attendance, the theoros acquires a qualiﬁ ca-
tion and certain privileges. Being a spectator is an 
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authentic form of participation, Gadamer wrote in 
his ‘Truth and Method’.2 Earlier, Martin Heidegger 
pointed out, in his essay ‘Science and Meditation’, 
that in the Greek world ‘... a way of life (bios)’ was 
based on theorein.3 Bios theoretikos was deﬁ ned 
by the philosopher as ‘the way of life of those who 
contemplate, who look in the direction of the pure 
appearance of things present’,4 in contrast to the 
bios praktikos, the existential mode that essentially 
implies action. However, even though Heidegger 
was aware of the difference, he stressed that: ‘... 
one thing must be kept in mind at all times: bios 
theoretikos, contemplative life, especially in its purer 
forms, is for the Greeks supreme action’.5
Architectural theory: aesthetics or discourse?
This brief excursion into the difﬁ cult problem of 
observation/reﬂ ection versus participation might 
explain why many theorists of architecture were of 
the opinion that architects involved in the process 
of designing buildings are unable to understand 
what they called the ‘essence’, the most important 
principle of architecture, unaffected by individual 
languages. In his essay ‘The Paradox of Archi-
tectural Theories at the Beginning of the ”Modern 
Movement”’, published in 1951, the architect and 
architectural essayist Paul Zucker claimed: ‘While 
architects in all German academies and institutes 
of technology at the end of the nineteenth century 
were taught in terms formulated by the holy trinity of 
Schinkel, Bötticher and Semper, new architectural 
theories were formulated from another side. Now no 
longer creative architects, but theoreticians began 
shaping a new approach toward architecture: Wölf-
ﬂ in, Schmarsow, and Adolf von Hildebrand...’.6 
Zucker stated the primacy of theory for modern 
architecture in shifting its focus from the issue of 
‘functional expression’ toward the more substantial 
issues of space, volume, symbol, and abstraction: 
‘It will be up to the architects of the second half of 
our century to express in their creations those ideas 
which were the intrinsic problems of the theoreti-
cians of the ﬁ rst decades of our century’.7
 Zucker was, of course, focusing on the written 
statements of architects and not only failed to recog-
nise that the issue of space was already very much 
an ‘intrinsic problem’ for architects in the ﬁ rst half 
of the twentieth century (e.g. Frank Lloyd Wright, 
Adolf Loos, or the Cubist architects in Prague), but 
also that this design work - along with new discov-
eries in the ﬁ eld of optical perception or psychology 
- contributed to the elaboration of theories on the 
Wesen der Architektur (‘essence’ or ‘nature’ of 
architecture) as formulated by architect-theorists 
such as Fritz Schumacher, Paul Klopfer or Geoffrey 
Scott. Although Zucker himself worked previously 
as a designer, his strict division of ‘architects’ and 
‘theorists’ followed the supposed gap between 
observation and participation. 
Ideas emerging outside of architecture will fertilise 
the practice of architecture by producing, in turn, a 
speciﬁ c knowledge, Zucker emphasised. We can 
easily extend the scope of Zucker’s investigation 
and consider other periods in which architecture 
as a discipline underwent a sweeping re-evalua-
tion of its entire program. One major shift was the 
crisis of Vitruvianism in the seventeenth century and 
the subsequent rejection of nature and the propor-
tions of the human body as models for architecture. 
Another blow, still resounding in the writings of Aldo 
Rossi, was delivered by Etienne-Louis Boullée, who 
rejected Vitruvius’ statement that architecture was 
the art of building and stressed the production de 
l’esprit as the constitution of architecture.8
Finally, the great theoretical systems of the 
nineteenth century attempted to look at the 
extra-architectural variables such as production, 
technology and material, from the perspective 
of their capacity to guide architecture toward an 
adequate, uniﬁ ed style. The speculation about 
space and its symbolism replaced the architectural 
theory of the nineteenth century, which was centred 
on issues of construction, technology, and the evolu-
tion of styles.
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In his 1951 essay, Paul Zucker described archi-
tectural theorists as ‘those who deal preponderantly 
with problems of architectural aesthetics’.9 The 
equation of architectural theory with aesthetics was 
a general phenomenon during the ﬁ rst half of the 
twentieth century. ‘This is certainly not a theory of 
building technology but of building-art [Baukunst], 
therefore an aesthetics’, Herman Sörgel already 
wrote in 1918 in the introduction to his important 
handbook ‘Theorie der Baukunst’, which consists 
of a historical-critical part (from Semper to Hilde-
brand), a theoretical-methodical part (aesthetics 
of perception) and a practical-applied part (ranging 
from material and technology to style and truth).10
Sörgel saw the task as the mediation between 
the architect and the philosophically or historically 
educated theorist, using aesthetics as a ‘rational’ 
antidote against similarly  ‘rational’ functionalism. 
Many important theorists trained in art history, 
such as Rudolf Wittkower, Rudolf Arnheim, Ernst 
Gombrich and Paul Frankl, developed analytical 
methods that became important tools for archi-
tects, often mediated by architectural critics like 
Colin Rowe. It is puzzling that Hanno-Walter Kruft 
disregarded practically all of them in his voluminous 
‘History of Architectural Theory’ (1985). His chap-
ters on twentieth-century architecture exclusively 
discussed the statements of practicing architects.11 
The fact that the authors who for Zucker repre-
sented architectural theory were now replaced by 
Van de Velde, Gropius, van Doesburg and Mies van 
der Rohe, indicates a major shift in the deﬁ nition of 
architectural theory: not the aesthetics of architec-
ture, but architecture itself in its structural relations 
with social life is now the focus of attention. 
We can locate the origin of this paradigm change 
in the situation of around 1968. Indeed, we can 
speak of the birth of a new architectural theory, as 
the conjunction of architectural history and politically 
engaged architectural criticism. The term ‘aesthetics’ 
was now carefully avoided by the representatives 
of this new theory as something superﬁ cial and 
unworthy of attention, since the real signiﬁ cance 
did not lie in the visual appearance of a building but 
in its socio-economic existence. The problem with 
this line of argumentation is that the elimination of 
aesthetics as a means of evaluating architecture 
as a product of human labour radically limits the 
means of making a critical judgment vis-à-vis the 
product (which is a pity, since the real differences 
between the proposals of Rem Koolhaas and the 
architects of New Urbanism lie in their respective 
aesthetics, rather than in their social programs). 
Still, the reconﬁ guration of architectural theory 
was, in retrospect, successful in the sense that its 
representatives could gain the necessary attention 
by establishing an international network of intellec-
tuals from in- and outside the discipline, forming a 
‘critical’ mass and acting as a resonating board. The 
Any conferences, held each year between 1991 and 
2000, were a case in point, even though the interest 
in a real exchange of ideas had declined during the 
ﬁ nal meetings.  
Manfredo Tafuri’s thesis regarding the impos-
sibility of a critical architecture contributed to the 
institutionalisation of a critical theory of architec-
ture.12 After 1973, ‘Oppositions’, the journal of 
the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, 
founded by Peter Eisenman, Kenneth Frampton, 
and Mario Gandelsonas, played a major role in 
this respect. The editors of ‘Oppositions’ wanted 
to create a committed critical voice, outside of 
academia or the architectural profession, although 
university journals such as Yale’s ‘Perspecta’, with 
its characteristic mixture of historical analysis and 
new projects, certainly served as a point of orienta-
tion. Still, the effect of the long-lasting hegemony 
of Clement Greenberg’s formalist aesthetics in the 
United States should not be underestimated. Just 
like ‘October’, the journal for theoretical inquiry in 
art which announces its rebellious spirit already in 
its title, ‘Oppositions’ became the forum for opinions 
calling the traditional foundations of architectural 
culture into question. 
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The initial goal of the editors of and contributors to 
‘Oppositions’, to revise the historiography of modern-
ism by critically investigating its socio-economic 
underpinnings, soon had to be revised itself: the 
journal shifted its focus toward the processes of 
signiﬁ cation in language and culture in general, 
and understandably, easily found allies in literary 
theory (the postmodernism of Fredric Jameson), 
semiotics (W.J.T. Mitchell, Norman Bryson), and in 
post-structuralist and deconstructivist philosophy. It 
is rather remarkable that, in spite of all its program-
matic claims, the sociology of art made almost no 
impact in the U.S., except maybe for a slight interest 
in Pierre Bourdieu’s work. Following the closure of 
‘Oppositions’, its successor ‘Assemblage’, founded 
in 1985 by architectural historian K. Michael Hays 
and literary theorist Catherine Ingraham, wanted 
to anchor the new journal in the poststructuralist 
academic discourse. The attempt of ‘Oppositions’ 
to ‘open’ up traditional architectural journalism with 
historiographical and critical tools helped ‘Assem-
blage’ to assign new roles to architecture. 
Strategies of literary criticism, such as misreading, 
and concepts borrowed from philosophy, psychoa-
nalysis or linguistics were used as guiding ideas for 
interpretations of design as well as design propos-
als. The growing distance from design practice, on 
the other hand, yielded the applause of a relatively 
small, mostly academic audience.
The rifts between architectural historians (writing 
for the established scholarly journals such as ‘The 
Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians’), 
architectural theoreticians (writing for journals such 
as ‘Oppositions’, ‘Assemblage’ or ‘Any’), and archi-
tects were impossible to overlook. The question 
was whether the discipline was self-contained, with 
an established object of study and a given meth-
odology, or - as Louis Althusser deﬁ ned science 
- whether it was a discipline which had a theory 
for its object of study. Architectural historiography 
itself became the object of theoretical research, with 
anthologies of architectural theory now a genre of 
its own, by now ﬁ lling many library shelves.13
As a result of this development, it is no longer 
possible to study architectural history without a 
critical reﬂ ection on the method of the study itself 
and without a certain grade of interdisciplinarity. 
However, the multitude of topics and methods which 
have appeared in architecture theory journals very 
rarely resulted in real interdisciplinary research; on 
the contrary, the restructuring of schools as a conse-
quence of the Bologna process and the necessity 
to secure funds has forced parts of the discipline 
to emphasise uniqueness and ‘core competences’. 
The recent ‘iconic turn’ is a telling example: art histo-
rians, historians of science, and architects are trying 
to establish their own interpretation of the ‘image’, 
producing competing deﬁ nitions of a Bildwissen-
schaft (science of images) - thus, it is no wonder 
that Klaus Sachs-Hombach speaks not of one disci-
pline, but of disciplines of ‘image science’ in his 
anthology of relevant texts of Bildwissenschaft.14  
Mining for metaphors
Ironically, architectural theory today, both as 
analysed by Kruft and as represented on the pages 
of ‘Oppositions’ and ‘Assemblage’, is an historical 
artefact; it is easy to compare them and see how 
traditional methods of historiography and iconog-
raphy have been replaced by new approaches 
conﬁ gured by psychoanalysis, deconstruction, 
epistemology, and by gender and cultural studies. 
Appropriation has become the proof of criticality 
both in architectural theory and in design, start-
ing with the ‘death of the author’, followed by the 
critique of representation, resigniﬁ cation and so on. 
Eisenman’s understanding of Chomsky’s linguistic 
distinction between surface and deep structure, of 
‘post-humanist’ displacement and de-centring, of 
Derrida’s misreading, all invented to call certain 
basic statements of hermeneutics into question, is, 
basically, metaphorical. By ‘using’ them in order to 
justify decisions of architectural design, Eisenman 
cancels their critical potential and turns them into 
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‘illustrations’. 
We should not underestimate the liberating effect 
of these and similar ideas on architecture; the 
attention to developments in other disciplines and 
in other ﬁ elds of culture was a signiﬁ cant change. 
But this new theory soon began to wither as it had 
increasingly lost touch with design practice. The 
most important warning signs were not so much the 
discounted theory books in the sales’ bins of book-
stores, but the grant applications showing no interest 
whatsoever in discovering anything new, yet bolster-
ing a reﬁ ned jargon which identiﬁ ed the authors as 
followers of intellectual fashions. This situation has 
had and still has devastating consequences both for 
scholarship, which can only decline without practi-
cal knowledge, and for practice, which expects 
some theoretical basis at least in order to establish 
the qualitative differences between possible results. 
It was in the catalogue of Peter Eisenman’s exhibi-
tion Cities of Artiﬁ cial Excavation, notably, that the 
art critic Yve-Alain Bois rang the alarm bell, stating 
that the symbiosis of architecture and philosophy is 
turning into a mutually exploitative relationship: 
During the last ten years or so we have seen archi-
tectural theory achieve its level of incompetence. 
It is simply not the case that architects write such 
good books or that philosophers have such inter-
esting ideas about architecture, and in a sense 
Eisenman’s recent exchange with Jacques Derrida 
marks a recognition, on both sides, that perhaps 
it is now time to put an end to the reciprocal trivi-
alization of their own discourses and the ﬂ ood of 
gobbledygook that poured out of their sycophants’ 
word processors.15
Bois accused architects like Eisenman of translat-
ing certain key concepts of the latest philosophical 
thinking into architectural form, rather than trying to 
understand its deeper signiﬁ cance - an accusation 
which could be directed against other architec-
tural trends with theoretical implications as well. In 
recent years we have seen that architectural theory 
makes a rather deliberate use of complex theories 
of natural sciences, such as genetics. It seems that 
many universities only bestow recognition, and 
therefore support, on disciplines that can be labelled 
‘sciences’. The results are clearly visible in the 
attempts of universities to have architectural design 
recognised as scientiﬁ c research - arguing that 
science itself lacks the solid basis and methodologi-
cal rigor with which it is normally associated. Facing 
the consequences, architectural theoreticians today 
are either happy to give up the observation post of 
the theoros and jump on the bandwagon of archi-
tecture marketing, or to withdraw to their studios to 
dedicate themselves to the recherche patiente in 
pursuit of the precision and delusion of the master-
work.
Design as research
A similar development can be observed in art, 
where a growing number of artists use methods 
taken from natural sciences such as biology, genet-
ics or geography. During the 1990s we have seen a 
new strategy emerging, moving rapidly away from 
the traditional concept of art and replacing it with 
notions borrowed from natural sciences. Catherine 
David, curator of ‘Documenta X’ in 1997, was inter-
ested in the responses of artists to phenomena such 
as global migrations and the transformation of cities 
and landscapes under such pressures. Artists such 
as Olaf Nicolai and Rosemarie Trockel exhibited 
their biological crossover-experiments, and Rem 
Koolhaas presented the results of his ‘ﬁ eld work’ in 
China, introducing ‘a number of new, copyrighted 
concepts, that [...] represent a new conceptual 
framework to describe and interpret the contempo-
rary urban condition’.16 Satellite imagery became 
particularly important for presenting the urban 
condition of Europe, as in the work of Stefano Boeri 
and the Multiplicity group, or in Switzerland, in the 
work of Studio Basel. Artists such as Peter Fend and 
Ingo Günter also use satellite photography of crisis 
regions to create the utopia of a ‘Refugee Repub-
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lic’. Architecture, urbanism and art appropriate the 
terminology, concepts and visualisation methods of 
science: ‘a world of numbers turns into diagrams. 
These diagrams work as emblems for operations, 
agendas and tasks. A ‘‘datatown” that resists the 
objective of style’, MVRDV write in the introduc-
tion to their book ‘Metacity Datatown’.17 Diagrams 
as emblems: the groundwork is laid here for a new 
iconography which is staged as a ‘reality show’.
Nobody seems to mind whether an artwork 
masquerading as ‘research’ fulﬁ ls the criteria of a 
research work in natural science - the possibility 
of veriﬁ cation, for example - as long as the work 
has an aesthetic value. But the problem is difﬁ cult: 
art has an almost nostalgic longing for regain-
ing ‘usefulness’ and for a ‘task’, though ties to the 
market and the production conditions of art prevent 
artists to consider themselves ‘free’. However, 
design and architecture show art a to be mirror 
image of itself, a mirror image of which art is horri-
ﬁ ed: a mere aesthetic shell for the social world. If an 
artwork is planned, generated or executed using the 
latest computer-controlled machinery, it is not the 
precision of CAD that will be appreciated, nor the 
sophistication of a cutting-edge processing package 
that will make a work of art out of CAM programs - 
not even when these programs are used in order to 
drive a milling machine to create a sculpture.  
While for art the ‘void’ of a blank sheet of paper or 
a video screen without theoretical or technological 
certainties is essential, architecture and architecture 
schools tend to fear any such void and ﬁ ll it with solid 
knowledge from the very beginning of a curriculum. 
The task of theory to demonstrate the provisional 
character of such ‘ﬁ llings’ is not a rewarding one, 
not even regarding its closest ally, architectural 
history, since the separation between the past 
and its representation is frequently pasted over. 
Implicitly or explicitly, architectural theory should 
investigate this separateness from the perspec-
tive of narrativity or by analysing the connection of 
historic consciousness to collective and individual 
memory. While Hayden White speaks of a total 
discontinuity between the messy, chaotic past and 
its ‘preparation’, its ordering for consciousness, 
Paul Ricoeur sees a connection based on narrativ-
ity. Everyday life and action have a narrativity based 
on the experience of the past, present and future; 
memory has a temporal structure, which makes 
memory and history parts of a continuum - even 
if there are breaks in this continuity. The process 
of collecting and selecting information introduces 
a ﬁ rst break between the heterogeneous historical 
material and the envisioned homogeneity of what is 
seen as the ‘representative’ body of work, followed 
by additional breaks of interpretation: the interpreter 
has to identify causes and construct convincing 
narrative structures. If architectural theory criticises 
these constructs as such, should it propose alterna-
tive explanations?
All these doubts are connected with the central 
issue: should every school of architecture deﬁ ne the 
channelling of young people toward the ‘profession’ 
as their most important task? And if the ‘profession’ 
itself is diversiﬁ ed today, should theory not try to 
act as a mediator between the different actors who 
shape the identity of the school? The problem with 
‘criticality’, or rather, the possibility of a critical self-
reﬂ ection, posits theory within the framework of an 
architectural school with speciﬁ c problems.
MoMA’s ‘Deconstructivist Architecture’ show in 
1988 clearly exhibited the early signs of exhaustion 
- critical theory giving way to the theoretical pack-
aging of the latest design propositions. The strong 
oedipal desire of ‘projective’ theory (albeit this term 
was not around yet) for a satisfying relationship with 
the market or even the willingness to deliver brand-
ing services for design practice are understandable 
after the long abstinence in the post-1968 era. 
Contemplating architectural theory’s ‘will to anthol-
ogy’, critics like Sylvia Lavin urge architectural 
theoreticians to return to their roots in architectural 
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history studies in order to achieve the ‘long-awaited 
radicalization of history’.18 The important question is 
whether this new desire will result in changes in the 
discipline, or whether built architecture will be given 
short shrift once again. 
Bachelors, masters, and masterpieces
The questions regarding architectural theory take 
on a new meaning and urgency in the context of 
architectural education. In a school of architecture 
there are as many architectural ‘philosophies’ as 
design studios, since those who teach architecture 
certainly could not do so without theoretical reﬂ ec-
tion. University presidents, in their relentless efforts 
to turn their institutions into ‘centres of competence’ 
funded by the state and by private research grants, 
opt for ‘design as research’. This term suggests that 
the advanced education of architects is aimed at 
comparability and the enhancement of the quality of 
written coursework. This, in itself a positive develop-
ment, nicely ﬁ ts in with the process of neo-liberal 
restructuring of higher education. Such doctorates 
frequently consist of a curious mixture of the tradi-
tional PhD thesis and the idea of the ‘masterpiece’, 
as required by the medieval guilds in order to be 
admitted into their ranks. In the announcement of a 
university course for a doctorate in the Liberal Arts 
in Hungary, for instance, we may read: ‘Our course 
realises the old world of traditional master courses: 
the focus of the course is the making, designing and 
realising of the independent masterpiece’.19 While it 
is easy to comment on such reanimation of the past 
with sarcasm, it demonstrates the need to cling on 
to authority, and, primarily, that the mere ‘presence’ 
of the master facing the ‘void’ we discussed above 
is a necessity in an art school. Let us now return to 
some of those remarks and see how the situation 
differs in an architectural school, and examine the 
consequences for theory. 
An architectural school is always deeply embed-
ded in the larger intellectual context of the time; 
today, this seemingly means that architectural 
education has been purged of all its metaphysical 
and teleological elements. Nobody would agree 
today (certainly not openly) with Otto Wagner, 
that the ‘mysterious and overwhelming power’ of 
architecture has to do with the ‘innate ability’ of the 
architect.20 But many of these discarded concepts 
are returning through the back door, as the celebra-
tion of the star architect or, as we have seen, in the 
myth of the masterpiece. The design studio is a ripe 
ground for such developments, since it could not 
exist without a consensus in terms of a so-called 
‘design philosophy’. As Charles Correa wrote about 
the dilemma of education: the studio of the master 
is one model, what he calls ‘the guru-chela system - 
a wonderfully effective process which unfortunately 
can all too easily result in the kind of brainwashing 
from which the chela [the apprentice] never recov-
ers. In the other model, we have the kind of healthy 
contemporary scepticism which ends up with learn-
ing hardly anything at all’.21
A ‘design philosophy’ tends to conceal its own 
ideological nature as a highly personal ars poetica, 
not leaving much space for critical questions and 
understanding. If this ‘philosophy’ only serves the 
justiﬁ cation of a design practice, the use of the term 
‘theory’ is unwarranted. On the other hand, an offen-
sive strategy to subsume design practice would 
damage theory in the long run, because the unful-
ﬁ lled as well as unfulﬁ llable claim for a  ‘theory-guided 
architecture’ could result in theory’s self-inﬂ icted 
isolation. The history of architecture, e.g. the differ-
ent meanings and programs ‘rationalism’ has taken 
on during the last century, demonstrates the limits 
of normative theory, just as it demonstrates the 
potential productiveness of theoretical ‘errors’ for 
architecture. Instead of condemning ideologies 
as documents of false consciousness, we should 
regard them as the possibility of the mind, capable 
of transcending the determinacy of knowledge by 
the actual social situation. 
 In order to pave the way for new experiments 
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in architecture, one must be critical of theoreti-
cal schemes and abstractions and build a method 
deductively, searching for a reﬂ ective equilibrium. 
We can agree with Aldo Rossi that ‘l’architettura 
sono le architetture’, but not in the sense that he 
meant it, that is, as the presence of the past in a 
dead language of architecture, but rather as a chain 
of experiments, as trials (and errors), as ‘constructs’ 
with a ‘constructedness’ which is not only uncon-
cealed but appreciated as an essential ‘quality’ we 
have to take into account and work with. 
 This means that the problem for a school of 
architecture lies not in the ‘criticality’ of the kind of 
architectural theory we described as emerging from 
the spirit of 1968, and subsequently becoming a 
sort of ennobling patina, but in its discursive nature. 
But the disciplinary speciﬁ city of architecture resists 
a discursive approach, and architectural students 
frequently question the usefulness of theory which 
undermines the foundations of practice, such as 
place, style, identity, tectonic, context, and even 
the notion of the ‘project’ itself, without articulating a 
constructive proposal. Projectivity does not seem to 
provide an answer; its claim of performativity lacks 
the program to regain its organising power over 
contributions from other specialised disciplines and 
practices. 
Nevertheless, all this does not mean that theory 
has to withdraw into ineffectiveness. The practice of 
theory, however, has to remain rooted in language, 
and should affect the use of language. A course in 
architectural theory has to question the very terms 
of architectural discourse. Theory should focus on 
the terms of our discipline, which are so close to our 
‘core beliefs’ regarding architecture that we usually 
take their meaning for granted. In order to under-
stand an architectural problem, however, we have 
to learn about the history of its central terms, the 
meaning of the words in their respective, relevant 
theoretical ‘surroundings’. ’Space‘, for example, 
had a very precise meaning for August Schmar-
sow, the German art historian who was among 
the ﬁ rst to analyse architectural space in 1893, 
and similarly precise, but quite different meanings 
for Martin Heidegger, Henri Lefebvre and Fernand 
Braudel. Is the notion of ‘space’ limited to the sum 
of these meanings in their respective surround-
ings? Can the architectural meaning of ‘function’ be 
clariﬁ ed by summing up the mathematical, biologi-
cal and mechanical understandings and usages of 
the word? Can we distinguish between correct and 
incorrect usages? Yet, is it not precisely the unwar-
ranted intrusion into the discourse of architecture 
of a term developed by another discipline that trig-
gers a process of induction, setting the scene for 
a new condition? These are questions of a differ-
ent kind than the question regarding the tensions 
in a cantilevered support. We can only expect 
such archaeological work and critical reﬂ ection to 
help us gain an understanding of the problems of 
space, function or tectonics, not to ‘solve’ them. In 
this respect, the terminology of architectural theory 
is closer to that of philosophy than to that of the 
natural sciences. 
Theory in an architectural school (a discipline 
which has different tasks than architectural theory 
in general) has to be helpful in relating questions 
arising from the confusion regarding the meaning 
of the words themselves to other, extra-architectural 
problems. Reﬂ ecting on issues such as space or 
identity requires further thought on issues of politics 
or the ethics of genetic research. Such a linguistic 
bricolage produces outcomes that are by no means 
predictable - but could, nevertheless, lead to stimu-
lating results, when the student succeeds in grasping 
seemingly diverse phenomena at a glance.
This might sound like a withdrawal of architectural 
theory into the realm of language. We are indeed 
dealing with language, but it would be wrong to 
see this focus of theory as a withdrawal. Indeed, 
after a period of theory alienating architects and the 
general public, it could now create a rhetoric to inﬂ u-
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ence our understanding of our environment, which 
is itself organised on the level of language. Any 
attempt to turn architectural theory into a research 
modelled on the ideal ontological quality of the 
natural sciences, delivering permanent results for 
practice to build on, will necessarily fail. On the 
contrary, the very requirement that theory should 
not be directly involved in design practice, but help 
students to grasp the underlying problems and their 
historic roots, will allow theory to exert its inﬂ uence 
on design development.
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